By
Uri Avnery, 18.11.06
THE
KEY word was "Hamas". It was spoken from the tribune and appeared on
printed material - but in two very different ways.
On
the tribune of the large annual memorial rally for Yitzhak Rabin, two weeks
ago, the writer David Grossman, the sole speaker at the event, gave an
important speech. Coming to the climax, he advised the Prime Minister:
"Appeal to the Palestinians, Mr. Olmert. Appeal to them over Hamas's head.
Appeal to the moderates among them, to those who, like you and me, oppose Hamas
and its ideology!"
At
the same time, dozens of Gush Shalom activists dispersed among the 100 thousand
participants of the rally to distribute a sticker that said, simply:
"Peace is made with enemies - TALK TO HAMAS!" They later reported
that some refused to take the stickers, but the majority accepted them
willingly.
These
two attitudes illustrate the dilemma which the Israeli peace camp is now
facing.
GROSSMAN'S
SPEECH aroused many echos. It was a brilliant speech, the speech of a writer
who has a way with words. The speech lifted the spirits of those present and
was treated by the media as an important event. True, Grossman did not mention
that he had initially supported the war and changed his view as it went on, but
this fact did lend even more credibility to his penetrating criticism of the
government.
He
did mention the personal tragedy that hit him, when his son, Uri, was killed in
the last hours of the war: "The calamity that my family and I
suffered…does not give me any special privileges in our national debate. But it
seems to me that facing death and loss brings with it a kind of sobriety and
clarity."
He
coined a new phrase that gripped the imagination and took hold of the public
discourse. "Our leadership, both political and military, is hollow!"
he declared. And indeed, that is the general feeling since the war: that this
is a leadership empty of all content, devoid of any plan, lacking all values,
whose only aim is to survive. He spoke about the "leadership" and not
about Ehud Olmert personally, but this adjective fits the man himself exactly:
a party functionary whose entire talent consists of devising tactical
combinations and spins, without any intellectual depth, without vision, without
an inspiring personality.
Another
image also caught the imagination. Speaking about the inclusion of Avigdor
Liberman in the government as Minister for Strategy, he said: "This is the
appointment of a compulsive pyromaniac to head the country's
firefighters."
I
could wholeheartedly identify with 90% of his speech. I could identify with
everything he said about the state of the State, about the moral and social
crisis, about the stature of our leaders and the national need to achieve
peace. If I had stood on the tribune (something quite impossible, as I shall
explain later on) I would have said similar things, which indeed my colleagues
and I have been saying for decades.
The
difference between us, and a profound difference it is, concerns the other 10%
of his speech. And, even more so, the things he did not say.
I
don't mean tactical matters. For example, in the entire speech there was no
mention of the role of the Labor Party in the government, in the war and in the
appointment of Liberman. Olmert is to blame for everything. Amir Peretz has
disappeared.
No,
I mean more substantial matters.
AFTER
THE frontal attack on the "hollow" leadership, which lacks vision and
plans, one would have expected Grossman to lay before the tens of thousand
peaceniks assembled in the square his own vision and plan for the solution of
the problem. But, as much as his criticism was clear and loud, his proposals
were vague and banal.
What
did he propose? To appeal to the "moderates" among the Palestinians
"over the head" of their elected government, in order to restart the
peace process. Not very original. That was said (but not done) by Ariel Sharon,
that was said (but not done) by Ehud Olmert and George W. Bush.
This
distinction between "moderates" and "fanatics" on the Arab
side is superficial and misleading. Basically, this is an American invention. It
evades the real problems. It contains a large measure of contempt for Arab
society. It leads to a dead end.
Grossman's
proposal diverts the discussion onto the path of "who to talk with"
and "who not to talk with", instead of stating clearly what to
talk about: the termination of the occupation, establishment of the
State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, withdrawal to the
pre-1967 border, solution of the refugee problem.
One
could reasonably expect that in such a speech, at such a place, on such an
occasion, these statements would be voiced loudly and clearly, instead of a
repetition of intentionally blurred formulas. "Go to them with the
boldest, most serious plan that Israel
is able to put forward, a plan that all Israelis and Palestinians with eyes in
their heads will know is the limit of refusal and concession, ours and
theirs." Sounds nice. But what does it mean?
After
all, it is clear that one has to make such a proposal to the elected
Palestinian leadership, whatever its composition. The idea that we can talk
with a part of the Palestinian people (now the minority) and boycott the other
part (now the majority) is false and misleading. It is also imbued with the
overbearing arrogance that is the hallmark of the occupation.
Grossman
has much empathy for the poor and downtrodden in Israeli society, and he
expresses it in moving words. It is obvious that he tries, really tries, to
feel a similar empathy with the suffering Palestinian society. But here he
fails. His is an empathy without pathos, without real feelings.
He
says that this is "a people no less tortured than we are." No less
than we? Gaza like Tel-Aviv? Rafah like Kfar-Sava? The effort to create a symmetry between occupier and occupied,
which has become typical for some of the peaceniks too, testifies to a basic
fault. That is true even if Grossman meant the untold suffering of the Jews
throughout the ages - even that does not justify what we are doing to the Palestinians
now.
About
the Palestinians, who voted for Hamas in a manifestly democratic election,
Grossman says that they are "hostages to fanatical Islam". He is
certain that they would change completely the moment Olmert "speaks with
them". That is, mildly put, a patronizing attitude. "Why did we not
use all our flexibility, all our Israeli creativity, to extricate our enemy
from the trap in which he ensnared himself?" Meaning: we are the thinking,
creative party, and we must liberate the poor Arabs from their mindless
fanaticism.
Fanaticism?
As a genetic trait? Or is it the natural wish to free themselves from a brutal,
choking occupation, an occupation from whose devastating grip they did not
succeed in freeing themselves when they elected a "moderate" government?
The
same is true for Grossman's second proposal - the one concerning Syria. On the
face of it, a positive suggestion: Olmert must accept every appeal from an Arab
leader who proposes peace. Excellent. But what does he advise Olmert to do in
practice? "Offer him (Assad) a peace process lasting several years, only
at the end of which, if he meets all the conditions, lives up to all the
restrictions, will he get the Golan Heights. Force him into a process of
ongoing dialogue." David Ben-Gurion or Ariel Sharon could not have put it
better.
Bashar
al-Assad certainly did not fall off his chair for sheer enthusiasm when he read
this.
IN
ORDER to understand Grossman's words one has to remember their background.
There
is not one Israeli peace camp, but two - and the difference between them is
important.
The
first camp, the Grossmanian one, calls itself the "Zionist peace
camp". Its strategic concept is that it is wrong to stray from what is
called the "national consensus". If we lose contact with the
consensus, so they believe, we shall not win over the public. Therefore we have
to tailor our message to what the public at large is able absorb at any time.
The
"Peace Now" movement is located at the center of this camp, and
several other groups and personalities belong to it. It is a perfectly
legitimate strategy, if only it were successful in winning over the masses. Unfortunately,
that has not happened: "Peace Now", which succeeded in 1982 in
mobilizing hundreds of thousands in the protest against the Sabra and Shatila
massacre, succeeded last week in attracting a mere 150 protesters against the
Beit Hanoun massacre. (The other movements which joined the demonstration
brought a similar number. Altogether, we were some 300.) About the same number
appeared in other recent demonstrations of "Peace Now", even those
which had more time for preparations.
This
camp keeps in close contact with two political parties: Meretz and Labor (at
least with the left wing). Almost all the founders and leaders of "Peace Now"
were candidates of these two parties, and several of them were elected to the
Knesset. One of the founders is now the Minister of Education in the
Olmert-Peretz war government.
THE
SECOND camp, usually called the "radical peace camp", carries out the
opposite strategy: to spell out our message loudly and clearly, even when it is
unpopular and far from the consensus (as it usually is). The assumption is that
the consensus will follow us when our message proves right in the test of
reality.
This
camp, to which "Gush Shalom" (in which I am active) belongs, together
with dozens of other organizations, is engaged in strenuous daily work: from
the fight against the Wall and all the other evil doings of the occupation up
to the boycott of the settlements and the support for soldiers who refuse to
serve in the occupied territories.
This
camp differs from the other one also in its close contacts with the
Palestinians, from the leadership down to ordinary villagers who are fighting
against the wall that robs them of their land. Recently, "Gush
Shalom" started a dialogue with Hamas leaders. These contacts enable us to
understand the Palestinian society in all its complexity, feelings, insights,
demands and hopes.
Not
being aligned with any party, this camp knows that it will not become a mass
movement. That is the price it has to pay. It is impossible to be popular while
taking stands and carrying out actions that are contrary to the consensus. If
so, how does it have an impact? How did it happen that, in the course of the
years, many of its stands have been accepted by the general public, including
luminaries like Grossman?
We
call this the "small wheel effect". A small wheel with its own drive
pushes a larger wheel, which drives an even larger wheel, and so on, until it
moves the center of the consensus. What we say today "Peace Now" will
say tomorrow, and a large part of the public on the day after.
This
has been proven dozens of times in the past, and was proven again in the last
few weeks during the Second Lebanon War. We called a demonstration against the
war on its first day, when the overwhelming majority - including Amos Oz, David
Grossman and others - supported it openly and wholeheartedly. But when the real
motives and the fatal results started to become obvious, the consensus began to
change. Our demonstrations swelled from 200 to 10,000 protesters. Even
"Peace now", which had supported the war in the beginning, changed
its stand, and near the end of the war called its own anti-war demonstration,
in conjunction with Meretz. In the end, the entire "national
consensus" moved.
It
may be true that the "radical peace camp" and the "Zionist peace
camp", while playing different roles, complement each other in the
decisive fight for public opinion.
GROSSMAN"S
SPEECH should be judged in this spirit.
It
was a moving speech, even a great speech. It did not contain all we would have
wished for, but for Grossman, and the camp he belongs to, it was really a big
step in the right direction.